This article highlights and analyses a hitherto largely neglected dimension to the growing agency of large developing countries in global affairs -their hosting of international sports mega-events. We see the hosting of sports-mega events as the practice of public diplomacy by states to both demonstrate existing soft power capability as well as pursue its further enhancement.
Introduction
There was a time when international sports governing bodies such as the International Federation of Association Football (FIFA) and the International Olympic Committee (IOC) had to persuade reluctant states to host their key events, the football World Cup and the Olympic and Paralympic Games respectively. The last three decades, however, has seen the increasing political salience of sport among governments of all political hues who see in it a relatively cheap means of improving a nation's image, credibility, stature, economic competitiveness and (they hope) ability to exercise agency on the international stage. This has led to the situation we have today, where even consistently popular states such as the United Kingdom (Anholt, 2012 ) are willing to spend over £17 million on attempting to win the right to host a sports mega-event such as the 2022 World Cup (House of Commons, 2011) . Up until very recently the key sports megaevents (World Cup and Olympic Games) were predominately staged by wealthy Western states.
Not anymore; large developing states have successfully entered the fray. Inter-state competition to host an event -even so-called second order international sports events such as the Commonwealth Games or Pan American Games (Black 2008 ) -is now fierce as a greater variety of states vie for a chance to avail themselves of the 'twin suns of prestige and profit' (Guttmann, 2002) thought to accompany the staging of these sports spectacles. While this observation in itself may not be new, there is very little research to date on the key reasons why this is the case beyond work that focuses on the link between sport events and domestic social and economic change. 1 The growing rivalry to host sports mega-events, and, in particular, the emergence of new players in this rivalry such as China (2008 Olympic Games), South Africa (2010 World Cup), India (2010 Commonwealth Games), Brazil (2014 World Cup; 2016 Olympics) and Qatar (2022 World Cup) are important and interesting developments in international politics that warrant detailed scholarly attention. While there has been significant reflection on the increasing power and influence of developing countries in international relations (IR) scholarship, and in particular the emerging powers (India, China, Brazil and South Africa), such analysis has focused almost 1 A notable exception is Scarlett Cornelissen's extensive work on South Africa's hosting of the 2010 FIFA World Cup. See Cornelissen (2004a; 2004b; 2011a; 2011b) , Cornelissen, Bob and Swart (2011) and Cornelissen & Swart (2006) . See also Ndlovu (2010) ; Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2011a; 2011b) ; Van der Westhuizen, & K Swart (2011) .
exclusively on their growing material sources of power -notably their remarkable economic growth in the last decade or so (Payne, 2008; . Several studies focus on the extent to which, as fast developing economies, these states play a far more active and influential role in global economic affairs and have become game changers in the governance of the global economy through routine involvement in international economic organizations such as the World Trade Organization and economic summits such as the G20 and the G8 (see. Alexandroff & Cooper , 2010; Li, 2009; Narlikar, 2010; Schirm, 2010; Stephen, 2012) . There certainly appears to be a structural shift in the global economy, with large developing countries such as Brazil, China and South Africa enjoying more economic power and influence beyond their region.
There is a key strand of this growing developing country agency in the international system that has yet to be explored; their now predominant role in hosting sports mega-events. A look at the list of countries hosting the Olympic Games and World Cup in the 21 st Century reveals a clear shift away from Western to Southern countries (see Table 1 below). There is not only a new order in the international political economy, but also one in the international politics of sports mega-events with the latter reinforcing the trends in the former. This development is analytically significant in two ways. First, it highlights the need to conceptualise emerging powers beyond the narrow materialist approach that currently dominates analysis of Brazil, China and South Africa's agency in global affairs. Second, it underscores the need to mainstream international sports into IR. The political willingness and economic ability of emerging states to bid for, and host, major sporting events, adds another important dimension to their growing authority in global affairs and highlights the diversity of the sources of their power which now goes beyond their emergent market status. 2 Thus, we present hosting sports mega-events as both evidence, and projections, 2 While recognising that China has enjoyed great power status in the post World War Two period as a permanent member of the United Nation's Security Council, Beijing has significantly broadened the scope of its global reach beyond this formal venue as its contemporary relationship with Africa indicates. See Alden, Large & De Oliveira (2008); Brautigham, 2009; Taylor (2009 Grix, 2013a; Levermore & Budd, 2004) . If IR is slowly waking up to the strategic significance of sports mega-events to states, scholars who have focused on states and their strategic use of sports mega-events and linked this with the concept of soft power are few and far between (Grix and Houlihan, 2013; Black, 2007; Finlay & Xin, 2010; Manzenreiter, 2010) 4 We build on this emergent literature by mobilising Joseph Nye's soft power concept to better understand states' strategic motivations behind bidding for and hosting sports mega-events and what they hope to achieve.
For Nye the changing nature of international relations after the end of the Cold War, and the risk attached to deploying traditional military forms of power, has led to 'intangible power resources such as culture, ideology, and institutions' becoming more important in inter-state relations (Nye, 1990: 167) . This should not be taken, however, to mean that Nye advocates replacing traditional hard power with soft power in international relations, but rather that states ought to make far more use of the latter. Nye distinguishes between power to 'influence the behaviour of others to get the outcomes one wants' (coercive power) and the ability to 'attract and co-opt them to want what you want' (soft power) (Nye, 2004: 2) . In this conceptualisation, the ideational dimension to soft power is key and is found in the ability of states to communicate universally shared values (such as, we argue, those rooted in international sporting competition) in order to court the publics of other states. Used in this way, soft power is a discursive mechanism for increased agency in global affairs through the performative politics of attraction rather than the use (or threat of use) of military or economic force. 5 In this sense soft power resides in the ability to shape the preferences of others and align those preferences to your own.
As such it is similar to Lukes' third dimension of power, 'the power to shape, influence or determine others' beliefs and desires, thereby securing their compliance' (Lukes, 2007: 90) , as well as the Habermasian notion of legitimation and persuasion in relation to explanations of domination within democracies (Habermas, 1979) .
In the cases of Brazil, China and South Africa we consider the extent to which soft power is being used to communicate their identity as similar to others on one level -on the assumption that similarity is key to attracting others -based on the reproduction of shared sporting norms and values at the core of international sporting events such as the Olympic Games and World
Cup. By hosting international sporting events they can show the world that they are guardians of universal norms and, in so doing, can construct attraction by illuminating truths such as fair play that have universal appeal. This willingness to champion existing shared sporting norms is an important point in their ability to attract the publics of other states because, as Qobo (2013) found democratic values in the post-apartheid era, not least through the politics of attraction embodied in Nelson Mandela, South Africa's first post-apartheid president. 6 In so doing it can also legitimately claim a place at the top table of multilateral summitry such as the G20 meetings and join the other emerging powers in extending their agency beyond their regional base.
The soft power of sports mega-events
Staging sports mega-events potentially provides emerging powers with opportunities to generate attraction even where they possess unattractive domestic political characteristics and we suggest that there is growing evidence to suggest that the international dimension of sporting success -be it national teams and national representatives abroad or staging a sports mega-event -is one arena in which the politics of attraction is played out through soft power. Externally, states seek to attract others through activities that 'create a favourable impression and increase understanding among foreign audiences' (Potter, 2009: 51 ; see also Sharp, 2009 Kurlantzik, 2007: 5) . That said, sometimes the strategy of attempting to use sports events to harness soft power can backfire and fail; witness the Formula 1 international motor race hosted by Bahrain in 2012 and 2013. On both occasions the event drew the kind of attention that host states fear as protestors used it to spotlight and criticise the undemocratic nature of the political regime (we refer to the negative side of sports mega-events in more detail below).
Sports mega events as public diplomacy
Public diplomacy, in its classical sense, is diplomacy directed at the public of other countries as opposed to traditional diplomacy that targets policy makers and governments (Sharp, 2009: 247) . 7 It is most often -though not always -a state driven activity which aims to create an open and responsive public milieu in other countries -an arena for the politics of attraction -in order to craft a more receptive environment for the foreign policies and economic interests of that given state using positive messages and images. Hosting major sporting events fits nicely with this concept of public diplomacy since such events are modern state-centric affairs which provide unique opportunities for hosting countries to fix the gaze of a global television audience.
Opening ceremonies are the embodiment of this rendition of the purpose and content of public diplomacy, involving the construction, celebration and mass communication of a positive account of the history and culture of the host nation to the publics of other countries. These events are the quintessence of the performative politics of attraction, of winning hearts and minds -and, of course, commercial opportunities.
The appeal to states of sports mega-events as a vehicle for the practice of internally as well as externally facing public diplomacy is that sport is a collective event which is culturally understood and socially played out through the lens of shared and celebrated universal values.
Constructed in this way, sport can play a key political role in nation building by arousing domestic pride in a national team's achievements and, at the international level, by signalling a collectively recognised identity on the international stage that is appealing to others (Maguire, 2002) . Sport also works on another level as part of the cultural sources of a state's soft power, along with broader cultural exchange (knowledge, language, art) between countries. Sports megaevents, foremost the World Cup and Olympic Games, are communicative practices that can be successful in attracting the attention of billions of people across the globe and are hence a perfect platform to showcase the hosting nation, their culture and image Lin, Lee & Nai, 2008: 28; Potter, 2009) . As communicative practices, international sporting events are important opportunities for hosting states to showcase their sameness (which is not only a core component of attractiveness to others but also a source of legitimacy as global agents). By successfully hosting a major sporting event to showcase shared social norms and sameness, the state can enhance its international prestige and attractiveness in order to boost their agency in international politics.
How this benefits the state deploying soft power is not made entirely clear in Nye's writings, but in successful cases -and South Africa's hosting of the 2010 World Cup is one -the result can be an improvement in a nation's image and political and economic credibility. By profiling and showcasing themselves globally they can attract others through inbound tourism, increased trade and inward investment, and a growing sense of national pride through the feelgood factor that accompanies major sports events (Grix, 2013b; Chaplin, 2006) . In turn, these internal developments provide the foundational elements that help the state supervise the political extension of the mega-event into a foreign policy soft power instrument. This is dependent upon effective global communication practices to cultivate attraction and international political legitimacy since 'legitimacy comes from common attraction' (Mattern, 2005: 595 and agency may be diminished. As such, public diplomacy as a means to enhance agency has its risks; the world's gaze can often be focussed on the negative aspects of the socio-economic and political system. Rather than becoming opportunities to attract they become events that repel.
We discuss three examples to highlight the usefulness of soft power as a broad-brush heuristic device to understand emerging states' motives for hosting sports mega-events. We highlight the constitutive, performative, and discursive nature and role of sports mega-events in international relations using a state-centric approach (since states drive the decision-making and funding around bidding and then lead the hosting process) to explore their public diplomacy praxis. The concept of soft power gains analytical traction once it is employed as a broad organising principle to understand a variety of state's motives for hosting sports mega-events. Authoritarian regimes (cf. China), advanced democratic states (UK, Australia etc.), autocratic states (Qatar) and emerging states (South Africa, Brazil) have been, or are, interested in using sport to increase their international credibility, prestige, and potential for agency. We put forward soft power as a concept to capture the diplomatic strategies these very different regime types undertake when hosting sports mega-events. We suggest that with the contemporary development of a global audience for international sports, recent and future Olympics and World Cups, the primary aim for host nations (see Table 1 ) is/will be the praxis of the politics of attraction through global image leverage and shared norm dissemination. They will have other, secondary, aims, but the politics of attraction is primary. 
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In what follows we briefly highlight the possibilities hosting a sports mega-event offers China, South Africa, and Brazil to practice public diplomacy in order to both project and boost their soft power. That each of these states have been successful in the bidding process to host the Olympics and World Cup is a remarkable achievement in itself, signally their individual arrival as credible powers but also collectively the new order of things not only in international sports but in the international system per se. We highlight the simple fact that hosting such events both signals, and promises further opportunities to enhance the agency of large developing countries in global affairs, and certainly beyond their regional bases. While it is far too early to confidently assert that the hosting sports mega-events has led to the socialisation of others and thus it is very clear that the idea is to extend and spread the Olympic (and FIFA) corporate brand to new and large markets. China adopted sport and sporting glory to assist domestically in validating its own political ideology, with several commentators arguing that the Beijing Games was more about propping up domestic support than showcasing the nation to the wider world (Brownwell, 2008; Collins, 2008) . Scholars have argued, however, that there is little doubt that China used the Olympics to promote its rise as an emerging power and aid its integration and agency in the international system (Lee, Bairner & Tan, 2008 ). If we accept Cull's notion of the Olympic project itself as an exercise in public diplomacy, then it is clear that China used the Beijing Games in search of the politics of attraction and the soft power that comes with this (Cull, 2008 ; See also Tomlinson, 2010) .
When thinking about China and sport most instinctively point to the example of the so-called 'ping-pong' diplomacy in 1971, an event which can be read as an 'ice-breaker' role for sport: after the United States (US) table tennis team had visited China in 1971, President Nixon lifted a 20 year trade embargo; thus initial sporting contacts between the US and China led on to more formal discussions and negotiations, following a basketball competition between the two countries one year later. The idea was to facilitate communication after a long freeze in relations (Epsy, 1979) ; the fact that the Chinese were clearly superior in ping-pong, and the US clearly superior in basketball, was designed to rob sport temporarily of one of its core attractions: its unpredictability. In this case sport is simply the means to an end: the opening of long-stalled diplomatic relations. With the hosting of an Olympics, however, sport moves from an icebreaker to an event that attracts the world's attention towards the host's handling of the event and its political and social systems. In so doing, the host's performance in the Olympic medal table becomes a sign of those systems' strengths vis-a-vis other nations (see Hilvoorde, Hilling & Stokvis, 2010) .
The example of the Beijing Games is instructive in indicating the risks involved in hosting sports mega-events for, on the one hand, if your state suffers from a poor image based on the past, poor human rights or undemocratic governance, then a major sports event could be the best way to re-socialise others towards a more positive image. On the other hand, however, showcasing your nation to a global audience -Beijing's cumulative TV audience reportedly topped 4 billion (international Olympic Committee, 2008) -and the intense media scrutiny that comes with it may not be quite the Olympic effect you seek and may not be the best way to improve your image and increase your influence on the world stage (DeLisle, 2008) . China, although a more closed society than most, still operates in a 'world of the internet and global satellite news' that means that the nation will be 'known as it is, not as it wishes to be' (Cull, 2008: 137) , leading to a constant stream of bad press around human rights issues.
China's hosting of the Olympics could be read not as an attempt to present a changed nation to the international community, but rather one that has arrived. As we discuss below in relation to Brazil, China is not attempting to be part of a core, occupied as it is by advanced capitalist states, but rather an emerging, alternative power to those in the West, as is clearly evident in its ongoing interventions in Africa. Despite the difficulty in measuring the impact that Beijing has had on China's international influence, Hall (2006: 64) is correct in arguing that 'the ability to attract events is often regarded as a performance indicator in its own right of the capacity of the city or region to compete' internationally. There is no doubt that South Africa took a risk in inviting the world's media to scrutinize its country for four weeks. With 49% of the population living under the poverty line, 25% of its population unemployed, 18% HIV/AIDS infection rate and an extremely high crime rate, it is easy to understand the misgivings of the world media that South Africa was even considered for the World Cup (Harris, 2011) . Despite these concerns, consensus among commentators is that this event has definitely put the new, democratic South Africa on the map, fulfilling one of their central foreign policy goals of presenting itself as a global middle power. A number of studies evidence this successful socialising of others, reporting changing perceptions among visitors to South Africa from negative to more positive (see Cornelissen, Bob & Swart, 2011; Donaldson & Ferreira, 2009; Holtzhausen & Fullerton 2013) . Some 309, 000 visitors came to South Africa for the World Cup (South African Tourism, 2010), with some 51% suggesting that they would never have thought of visiting had it not been for the Finals (Knott, Fyall & Jones, 2013) . There is, therefore, some evidence to show that South Africa has been able to attract foreign publics as the first African state to hold a global sports mega-event and that it was successful in practicing the politics of attraction in hosting the 2010 World Cup.
World Cup and 2018 Olympic Games: Brazil's shift from regional to global power
The final example differs from the above in so far as the sports mega-events have yet to take place (2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympic Games) and so our examination of the politics of attraction focuses on the bidding process (socialising the IOC and FIFA decision-makers). Brazil is at the forefront of the new emerging powers discourse; already the world's fourth largest democracy, towards the end of 2011 Brazil overtook the UK to become the world's sixth largest economy. While wider debates rage about the ways in which Brazil will exercise its newly found power in the international system (Vieira, 2012) , the unprecedented hosting of the two largest however, in Brazil's case, it is not simply to announce that it is ready to join the advanced western capitalist states (that is, move from the periphery to the core), but to indicate its shift from a regional actor to a global actor in international affairs. As we have suggested, sports mega-events are part of a package of measures used by emerging states to express and enhance their soft power; however, sport is an ideal mode because of its universal appeal and an ability to cross deep cleavages in society, which makes it attractive to event hosts, but also to a global audience and an essential factor in the politics of attraction exercised by hosting states.
Winning the bidding process for the Olympics or World Cup usually sends out a number of positive signals of inclusion and acceptance in the international system: being chosen for two in short succession suggests that the IOC and FIFA have enough trust in Brazil to put on successful events and a belief that it can put its historical in-fighting to one side, streamline its culture of opaque bureaucracy and clamp down on the rampant corruption linked to its political elite (Rohter, 2010) . That is, re-fashion the unattractive political and social elements. The latter is reflected in Brazil's 69 th spot in the 2012 'corruption index' put together by the NGO 'Transparency International', joint with South Africa and eleven places above China.
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Providing both events are successful, staging them will constitute another step on the way to becoming an embedded regional, and global, power. Brazil's rise is clearly not just economic; this is likely to be matched by political influence as we have seen with the examples of China and South Africa both of whom are, post event, established participants in multilateral summits such as the G20.
Conclusion
Brazil, China and South Africa have less in common than the analytical compartmentalising of them as emergent powers would suggest. They are not, for instance, equally emerging; China's economy is growing faster than Brazil's or South Africa's, and China has long been a nuclear power and permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. What they do have in common, however, is that they have all become predominant players in the hosting of sports mega-events. In this article we have explored this contemporary phenomenon, arguing that it 
